The principle of signature exchangeability  by Ronel, Tahel & Vencovská, Alena
Journal of Applied Logic 15 (2016) 16–45Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Applied Logic
www.elsevier.com/locate/jal
The principle of signature exchangeability
Tahel Ronel 1, Alena Vencovská ∗,2
School of Mathematics, The University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, United Kingdom
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 11 August 2015
Accepted 19 October 2015
Available online 14 November 2015
Keywords:
Constant exchangeability
Pure inductive logic
Polyadic atoms
Polyadic signature
Instantial relevance
Johnson’s suﬃcientness postulate
Rationality
Uncertain reasoning
Probability
We investigate the notion of a signature in Polyadic Inductive Logic and study 
the probability functions satisfying the Principle of Signature Exchangeability. We 
prove a representation theorem for such functions on binary languages and show 
that they satisfy a binary version of the Principle of Instantial Relevance. We 
discuss polyadic versions of the Principle of Instantial Relevance and Johnson’s 
Suﬃcientness Postulate.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article 
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
This paper is set in Pure Inductive Logic (PIL), see for example [10], which the reader is referred to 
for background3 and an extensive bibliography. In this subject, we are concerned with assigning subjective 
probabilities to sentences of a language according to rational considerations, traditionally based on the 
notions of symmetry, relevance and irrelevance.
The principle of Constant Exchangeability (Ex) or in Carnap’s terms, the Axiom of Symmetry [1,3], is 
a widely accepted and commonly assumed rational requirement in Pure Inductive Logic. Informally, this 
is the statement that in the absence of further knowledge, diﬀerent individuals of our universe should be 
treated equally. In the usual framework of Inductive Logic it means that the probability assigned to a 
sentence is independent of the particular constants instantiating it. In addition, in the thoroughly studied 
unary context, this principle exists in an equivalent formulation – as invariance under signatures of state 
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: tahel.ronel@manchester.ac.uk (T. Ronel), alena.vencovska@manchester.ac.uk (A. Vencovská).
1 Supported by a UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council PhD Grant.
2 Supported by a UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council Research Grant.
3 In particular, the goals and methods of PIL are clearly illustrated in the ﬁrst short chapter of [10].http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2015.11.002
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in Unary Inductive Logic thus far. These include, for example, a complete characterisation of functions 
satisfying Ex, and the Principle of Instantial Relevance (see page 19) following as a logical consequence of 
Constant Exchangeability.
In contrast, such results have so far not translated satisfactorily into the polyadic. Having extended the 
concept of atoms to polyadic languages (see [10,12]), in this account we generalise the notion of a signature to 
polyadic Inductive Logic and investigate the theory this yields for higher arity languages. We begin by giving 
a brief account of the unary portion we shall be concerned with for the purpose of this paper, then suggest 
new methods and formulations for these concepts for general polyadic languages. Speciﬁcally, we present a 
polyadic deﬁnition of a signature and a principle of invariance under this notion, an independence principle 
characterising the basic functions satisfying this new signature-based principle, and polyadic versions of 
the Principle of Instantial Relevance and Johnson’s Suﬃcientness Postulate. We present this initially for 
languages with at most binary relation symbols and then, in Section 3 of the paper, we focus on the general 
case.
The context of this paper is as follows. We work with a ﬁrst order language L containing ﬁnitely many rela-
tion symbols R1, . . . , Rq of arities r1, . . . , rq respectively and countably many constant symbols a1, a2, a3, . . .
(which are intended to exhaust the universe), using the usual logical connectives and quantiﬁers. SL de-
notes the set of all sentences of the language L and QFSL the set of all quantiﬁer-free sentences of the 
language. b1, . . . , bn or sometimes also b′1, . . . , b′n are used to denote some distinct constants from amongst 
the a1, a2, . . ., and Sn stands for the set of permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We say that a language is unary if it contains only unary predicate symbols; it is r-ary if all its relation 
symbols are at most r-ary and at least one is r-ary. If r = 2, we say binary rather than 2-ary.
Deﬁnition. A function w : SL → [0, 1] is a probability function if for all θ, φ and ∃x ψ(x) ∈ SL
(P1) If θ is logically valid then w(θ) = 1.
(P2) If θ and φ are mutually exclusive then w(θ ∨ φ) = w(θ) + w(φ).
(P3) w(∃x ψ(x)) = limn→∞ w(ψ(a1) ∨ ψ(a2) ∨ . . . ∨ ψ(an)).
Probability functions have a number of desirable properties, see for example [10, Chapter 3]; note in 
particular that logically equivalent sentences always get the same probability. We will be interested in 
sentences and formulae only up to logical equivalence, and somewhat abusing notation we will often use ‘=’ 
in place of ‘≡’.
The conditional probability of θ given φ, for φ such that w(φ) = 0, is deﬁned as follows:
w(θ |φ) = w(θ ∧ φ)
w(φ) .
We adopt the convention that expressions like w(θ | φ) = a stand for w(θ ∧ φ) = a w(φ) even if w(φ) = 0.
Any w satisfying just (P1) and (P2) on the quantiﬁer free sentences of L has a unique extension to a 
probability function on SL, see [6], so in many situations it suﬃces to think of probability functions as 
deﬁned on quantiﬁer-free sentences only, and satisfying (P1) and (P2).
As explained in [10, Chapter 7], this can be further reduced to a special class of such sentences called 
state descriptions, that is, to sentences Θ(b1, . . . , bm) of the form
q∧
i=1
∧
ri
± Ri(bj1 . . . , bjri ) (1)
〈j1...,jri 〉∈{1,...,m}
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state descriptions Θ(a1, a2, . . . , am), m ∈ N to satisfy
(i) w(Θ(a1, a2, . . . , am)) ≥ 0,
(ii) w(
) = 1,
(iii) w(Θ(a1, a2, . . . , am)) =
∑
Φ(a1,a2,...,am+1)|=Θ(a1,a2,...,am)
w(Φ(a1, a2, . . . , am+1))
extends uniquely to a probability function on QFSL and hence on SL.
If Θ(b1, . . . , bm) is a state description then Θ(x1, . . . , xm) is called a state formula. We use the capital 
Greek letters Θ, Φ, Ψ for state descriptions and state formulae.
For a state description Θ(b1, . . . , bm) and distinct k1, . . . , kg from {1, . . . , m},
Θ(b1, . . . , bm)[bk1 , . . . , bkg ] ,
or simply Θ[bk1 , . . . , bkg ], denotes the restriction of Θ(b1, . . . , bm) to bk1 , . . . , bkg . That is, the conjunction of 
the literals from (1) with {j1, . . . , jri} ⊆ {k1, . . . , kg}.
When the language is r-ary, the state formulae for r variables are called (polyadic) atoms, see [12] or [10]. 
In the case of a unary language, the atoms are the conjunctions 
∧q
i=1 ±Ri(x) and they are usually denoted 
α1(x), . . . , α2q (x).
The idea of atoms has played an essential role in the study of Unary Inductive Logic since its conception 
by Johnson and Carnap, even if their formal expression of it diﬀered [7,2]. In particular, unary atoms have 
been used to formulate and investigate basic principles of the subject. This is possible, since unary state 
descriptions are the conjunctions of (instantiated) atoms,
Θ(b1, . . . , bm) =
m∧
j=1
αhj (bj) (2)
(where hj ∈ {1, . . . , 2q}), and thus unary atoms form the basic building blocks of all sentences of a unary 
language.
1.1. Some basic principles of Unary Inductive Logic
The Principle of Constant Exchangeability is usually stated for a general (not necessarily unary) language 
as follows:
Constant Exchangeability, Ex. Let θ(a1, . . . , am) ∈ SL and let b1, . . . , bm be any other choice of distinct 
constant symbols from amongst the a1, a2, . . .. Then
w(θ(a1, . . . , am)) = w(θ(b1, . . . , bm)) . (3)
It can be equivalently expressed as requiring (3) to hold only for state descriptions Θ instead of general 
θ ∈ SL, see [10, Chapter 7]. This leads to a simpler formulation of Ex for unary languages (as mentioned 
above), based on the notion of a signature. The signature of a state description Θ as in (2) is deﬁned to 
be the vector 〈m1, . . . , m2q 〉 where mi is the number of times that αi appears amongst the αhj . Ex in the 
unary case thus amounts to
Constant Exchangeability, unary version. The probability of a state description depends only on its signa-
ture.
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of (unary) atoms.
Atom Exchangeability, Ax. Let Θ(b1, . . . , bm) =
∧m
j=1 αhj (bj) be a state description and σ ∈ S2q . Then
w
⎛
⎝ m∧
j=1
αhj (bj)
⎞
⎠ = w
⎛
⎝ m∧
j=1
ασ(hj)(bj)
⎞
⎠ .
This principle can be equivalently expressed as requiring that state descriptions 
∧m
j=1 αhj (bj) and ∧m
j=1 αgj (bj) satisfying
hj = hl ⇐⇒ gj = gl
must have the same probability.
Principle of Instantial Relevance, PIR.
w
⎛
⎝αi(am+2) | m∧
j=1
αhj (aj)
⎞
⎠ ≤ w
⎛
⎝αi(am+2) | αi(am+1) ∧ m∧
j=1
αhj (aj)
⎞
⎠ .
This principle was suggested by Carnap [2, Chapter 13] and expresses the idea that having witnessed an 
event in the past should enhance (or at least should not decrease) our belief that we might see it again in 
future.
Johnson’s Suﬃcientness Postulate, JSP. w
(
αi(am+1) |
∧m
j=1 αhj (aj)
)
depends only on m and on mi, where 
mi is the number of times that αi appears amongst the αhj .
First appearing in [7], JSP states that our belief in seeing an individual with a certain combination of 
properties should depend only on how many individuals we have seen, and how many of them have satisﬁed 
exactly the same combination of properties.
Unary Principle of Induction, UPI. Assume that mi ≤ ms, where mi, ms are the numbers of times that 
αi, αs respectively appear amongst the αhj . Then
w
⎛
⎝αi(am+1) | m∧
j=1
αhj (aj)
⎞
⎠ ≤ w
⎛
⎝αs(am+1) | m∧
j=1
αhj (aj)
⎞
⎠ .
This principle [10, Chapter 21] says that if we have already seen at least as many individuals with a 
certain combination of properties as with another combination, we should think the next individual at least 
as likely to have the ﬁrst combination of properties as the second.
Finally, we mention the (not necessarily unary) Constant Irrelevance or Independence Principle. It is not 
stated in terms of atoms, but it plays a role in what follows.
Constant Independence Principle, IP. Let θ, φ ∈ QFSL have no constant symbols in common. Then
w(θ ∧ φ) = w(θ) · w(φ).
In the unary context [10, Chapter 8], the only probability functions satisfying IP together with Ex are 
the wx functions, where x = 〈x1, . . . , x2q 〉 is from
D2q =
{
〈x1, . . . , x2q 〉 | x1, x2, . . . , x2q ≥ 0 and
2q∑
xi = 1
}i=1
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wx
⎛
⎝ m∧
j=1
αhj (bj)
⎞
⎠ = m∏
j=1
xhj =
2q∏
i=1
xmii ,
where mi is again the number of times that αi appears amongst the αhj . Thus wx is the (unique) function 
that assigns the probability xi to all αi(aj) regardless of j, and treats instantiations of atoms (both the 
same or diﬀerent) by distinct constants as stochastically independent. These functions are remarkably useful 
because they are simple and since all unary probability functions satisfying Ex can be generated from them 
as continuous convex combinations (integrals). The precise statement of this claim [5] is
de Finetti’s Representation Theorem. Let L be a unary language with q predicate symbols and let w be a 
probability function on SL satisfying Ex. Then there is a normalised, σ-additive measure μ on the Borel 
subsets of D2q such that
w(Θ) =
∫
D2q
wx(Θ) dμ(x)
for any state description Θ of L, and conversely, given such a μ, w as above extends uniquely to a probability 
function on SL satisfying Ex.
Early results of Unary Inductive Logic show that any probability function satisfying Ex also satisﬁes 
PIR (as already mentioned, [6]), and that – provided the language has at least two predicate symbols – 
any probability function satisfying Ex and JSP must be one of rather special functions called the Carnap 
Continuum functions ([7], and others). A later result due to Paris and Waterhouse [9] shows that any 
probability function satisfying Ex and Ax must also satisfy UPI.
These are pleasing results in Pure Inductive Logic, since we know that if we make these rational require-
ments, we also gain their consequences – a PIL version of ‘buy one (or two), get one free’. So, for example, 
if we are happy to accept Ex and Ax we also gain the appealing UPI.
2. An atom-based approach for binary languages
We shall now consider how atoms can aid us to understand the properties of probability functions in the 
case when r is 2. That is, when L contains some binary relation symbols and possibly some unary predicate 
symbols, but no symbols of higher arity. We shall denote the unary predicate symbols by P1, . . . , Pq1 and 
the binary symbols by Q1, . . . , Qq2 (rather than by Ri as we do for a general language), with q1 + q2 = q.
In this language, the state formulae for one variable have the form
q1∧
i=1
±Pi(x) ∧
q2∧
i=1
±Qi(x, x)
and we will write
β1(x), . . . , β2q (x)
for them (in some ﬁxed order). We also refer to these formulae as 1-atoms (since they act on one individual).
The atoms of the language,4 that is, the state formulae for two variables, have the form
4 We sometimes say binary atoms for emphasis or, in some contexts later on, also 2-atoms. Note that 2-atoms will mean the 
same thing as atoms just when the language is binary.
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q2∧
i=1
±Qi(x, y) ∧
q2∧
i=1
±Qi(y, x) .
There are N = 22q22q2 atoms, and we shall denote them by
γ1(x, y), . . . , γN (x, y) .
In order to help visualise the binary case, we introduce the notation δs(x, y) for the conjunctions ∧q2
i=1 ±Qi(x, y), where s = 1, . . . , 2q2 . Any atom γh(x, y) can then be written as
βk(x) ∧ βc(y) ∧ δe(x, y) ∧ δd(y, x) (4)
for some 1 ≤ k, c ≤ 2q, 1 ≤ e, d ≤ 2q2 . We shall represent such an atom by the matrix
(
k e
d c
)
.
We refer to βk(x) ∧ βc(y) as the unary trace of the atom (4).
Example. When L has one unary predicate symbol P and one binary relation symbol Q (that is, when 
q1 = 1, q2 = 1) then
β1(x) = P (x) ∧ Q(x, x) β2(x) = P (x) ∧ ¬Q(x, x)
β3(x) = ¬P (x) ∧ Q(x, x) β4(x) = ¬P (x) ∧ ¬Q(x, x)
and δ1(x, y), δ2(x, y) are Q(x, y), ¬Q(x, y) respectively. One possible atom of this language is
P (x) ∧ P (y) ∧ Q(x, x) ∧ Q(y, y) ∧ ¬Q(x, y) ∧ Q(y, x),
and it is represented by the matrix
(
1 2
1 1
)
.
Using atoms, a state description of L can be written as
Θ(b1, . . . , bm) =
∧
1≤i,t≤m
γhi,t(bi, bt) (5)
and it can be represented by an m × m matrix
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
k1 e1,2 e1,3 . . . e1,m
d1,2 k2 e2,3 . . . e2,m
d1,3 d2,3 k3 . . . e3,m
...
...
... . . .
...
d1,m d2,m d3,m . . . km
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(6)
for some
1 ≤ ki ≤ 2q, 1 ≤ ei,t , di,t ≤ 2q2 .
22 T. Ronel, A. Vencovská / Journal of Applied Logic 15 (2016) 16–45This means that depending on whether i < t or t < i, γhi,t is
(
ki ei,t
di,t kt
)
or
(
kt di,t
ei,t ki
)
respectively, and γhi,i is
(
ki e
e ki
)
for that e for which Θ(b1, . . . , bm) |= δe(bi, bi).
Clearly, there is much over-speciﬁcation in the expression (5); for example, we must have γht,i(x, y) =
γhi,t(y, x). A more eﬃcient way of writing a state description (for at least two individuals) in terms of atoms 
is to restrict i, t in (5) to i < t,
Θ(b1, . . . , bm) =
∧
1≤i<t≤m
γhi,t(bi, bt) .
This contains all the information about Θ and it still over-speciﬁes all that concerns single individuals. In 
this paper we will ﬁnd it convenient to make this part of the state description visible, so we shall write it as
Θ(b1, . . . , bm) =
∧
1≤i≤m
βki(bi) ∧
∧
1≤i<t≤m
γhi,t(bi, bt). (7)
This works even when m = 1. We adopt a convention that if needed we still write γht,i(x, y) for γhi,t(y, x).
Deﬁnition. For Θ as in (7), we deﬁne
∧
1≤i≤m
βki(bi) (8)
to be the unary trace of Θ. Any conjunction of this form is called a unary trace for b1, . . . , bm.
We remark that when using atoms, some over-speciﬁcation is unavoidable. It is possible to develop an 
approach to Polyadic Inductive Logic using just elements5 rather than atoms (where elements in the binary 
case are the conjunctions 
∧q1
i=1 ±Pi(x) and the conjunctions 
∧q2
i=1 ±Qi(x, y), and analogously for higher 
arity languages), and thus to avoid over-speciﬁcation. However, such a ‘disjointed’ approach fails to capture 
much of the structure of the sentences we wish to work with. For example, in the disjointed approach, the 
ordered pairs obtained from each other by changing the order of the two individuals are treated separately, 
and although there are some advantages to doing this, some crucial connections are lost.
Using the alternative formulation of the unary Atom Exchangeability principle from page 19, and (5), 
it is straightforward to see how to formulate a binary counterpart of the Atom Exchangeability principle. 
The same approach works also for higher arity languages. This was investigated in [12] and it appears also 
in [10], so we will not pursue it in the present paper any further.
For the other principles we will need also the concept of a partial state description. These are sentences 
which, like state descriptions, specify all that can be said about all single individuals from amongst the 
b1, . . . , bm, and all that can be said about some pairs of them:
5 See [11, Chapter 7].
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Δ(b1, . . . , bm) =
∧
1≤i≤m
βki(bi) ∧
∧
{bi,bt}∈C
i<t
γhi,t(bi, bt) , (9)
where C is some set of 2-element subsets of {b1, . . . , bm}.
We use capital Greek letters also for partial state descriptions.
Example. Using the representation described above for L containing just one binary relation symbol Q, the 
matrix
1 1 1 2
1 1 1 2
1 1 1 2
2 2 2 1
represents the (full) state description
3∧
i,t=1
Q(bi, bt) ∧
3∧
i=1
(¬Q(bi, b4) ∧ ¬Q(b4, bi)) ∧ Q(b4, b4) ,
while
1 1
1
2 1 2
2 1
represents the partial state description
4∧
i=1
Q(bi, bi) ∧ (Q(b1, b3) ∧ ¬Q(b3, b1)) ∧ (¬Q(b3, b4) ∧ ¬Q(b4, b3)).
The matrix
1 1
1 2
2 1 2
2 1
represents no partial state description since it gives some – but not all – information about the pair b2, b3. 
Specifying also Q(b3, b2) or ¬Q(b3, b2) would turn it into a partial state description.
We remark that if C in (9) contains no 2-element subsets, that is C = ∅, then (9) is still a partial state 
description. In particular, a unary trace for b1, . . . , bm is a partial state description for b1, . . . , bm. Secondly, 
we mention that partial state formulae are deﬁned analogously to partial state descriptions, with b1, . . . , bm
replaced by (distinct) variables x1, . . . , xm.
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In Unary Inductive Logic, it is almost always the case that Ex is assumed. If we wish to continue assuming 
Ex and to base our theory on polyadic atoms, we need to be able to work with the atoms in a way which 
reﬂects that atoms obtained from each other by permuting the variables are in some sense equivalent and 
represent the same thing.
In the binary case, atoms have two variables and there is only one non-trivial permutation of {x, y}. If 
γ(x, y) is the atom represented by
(
k e
d c
)
then permuting x and y yields the atom represented by
(
c d
e k
)
.
If k = c and e = d then these are the same atom.
Hence, when wishing to disregard the order, the behaviour of pairs of individuals should be classiﬁed by 
the atom they satisfy, only up to the equivalence deﬁned on atoms by
(
k e
d c
)
∼
(
c d
e k
)
.
This means that rather than N diﬀerent ways a pair can behave, there are p < N of them, where p is 
the number6 of ∼-equivalence classes.
It will be convenient to introduce notation for these equivalence classes; we shall denote them by 
Γ1, . . . , Γp. From above, it follows that each class is
{ (
k e
d c
)
,
(
c d
e k
) }
(10)
for some k, c, e, d, and it has either two elements, or just one (when k = c and e = d). For ﬁxed k and c, 
A(k, c) will denote the set of all j such that Γj consists of the atoms (10) for some e, d.
Within the equivalence class (10), the unary trace of an atom determines the atom, except when k = c
and e = d. We shall associate a number with each class Γj accordingly: 1 if the unary traces do determine 
its atoms and 2 otherwise. We denote this number sj .
Deﬁnition. The signature of a state description
Θ(b1, . . . , bm) =
∧
1≤i≤m
βki(bi) ∧
∧
1≤i<t≤m
γhi,t(bi, bt)
is deﬁned to be the vector 〈n1, . . . , np〉, where nj is the number of 〈i, t〉 such that 1 ≤ i < t ≤ m and 
γhi,t ∈ Γj . If Θ is represented by (6) and Γj is (10), then nj is the number of times one of the atoms from 
(10) appears as a submatrix of (6).
6 Explicitly, p = (N + 2q · 2q2 )/2.
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mn = 〈m1, . . . ,m2q ; n1, . . . , np〉,
where mk is the number of times that k appears amongst the ki, i = 1, . . . , m.
We remark that the extended signature is derivable from the signature, but it will be convenient for us 
to record the m part explicitly.
Note that if mn is the extended signature of some state description Θ(b1, . . . , bm) then
2q∑
k=1
mk = m, (11)
for k = c
∑
j∈A(k,c)
nj = mkmc , (12)
and
∑
j∈A(k,k)
nj =
mk(mk − 1)
2 . (13)
Conversely, thinking about state descriptions in terms of matrices as in (6), we can see that any mn =
〈m1, . . . , m2q ; n1, . . . , np〉 such that (12) and (13) hold, is an extended signature of some Θ(b1, . . . , bm) for 
m deﬁned by (11), so we refer to such vectors as extended signatures on m.
If the binary case behaved like the unary, Ex would be equivalent to the requirement that the probability 
of a state description depends only on its signature. However, as we shall see below, this is not the case and 
so we are led to deﬁne the
Signature Exchangeability Principle (binary), BEx. Let L be a binary language and let w be a probability 
function on SL. Then the probability of a state description depends only on its signature.
BEx clearly still implies Ex but the converse implication does not hold: BEx is strictly stronger than 
Ex. Rather than providing a general proof, we will illustrate why this is so on the case of the language L
containing just one binary relation symbol Q.
The state descriptions represented by
1 1 1 2
1 1 1 2
1 1 1 2
2 2 2 1
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 2
2 1 1 1
2 2 1 1
have the same signature but there are probability functions satisfying Ex that give these state descriptions 
diﬀerent probabilities. For example, up¯,L with p¯ = 〈0, 12 , 12 , 0, 0, . . .〉, see [10, Chapter 29], is one such function.
The probability functions satisfying BEx share a number of properties with those satisfying Ex in the 
unary case. In particular, there is a large class of relatively simply deﬁned probability functions similar 
to the unary wx (as described on Page 20) which satisfy BEx. These functions are characterised by an 
independence principle similar to the Constant Independence Principle (IP). In addition, there is a de 
Finetti-style representation theorem telling us that any probability function satisfying BEx can be expressed 
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generalisation of the Principle of Instantial Relevance, and a characterisation of a binary Carnap Continuum 
as the unique functions satisfying a binary generalisation of Johnson’s Suﬃcientness Postulate. We begin 
with independence.
2.2. Binary independence
The Constant Independence Principle IP (for any language), see page 19, requires that any two quantiﬁer-
free sentences which have no constants in common are stochastically independent. In other words, probability 
functions satisfying this principle have the property that evidence concerning certain individuals has no im-
pact on probabilities assigned to sentences involving diﬀerent individuals.
In sentences involving only unary predicate symbols, occurrences of predicates are instantiated by single 
constants; no predicate can bring two constants together in the way binary relations do. Hence, when 
the language is unary, the notion of independence used in IP is the strongest one, based on requiring 
that individuals do not interfere with others. In the binary case, however, beyond simply requiring that 
individuals do not interfere, we may require the same of pairs of individuals in the following sense.
Deﬁnition. For a sentence ψ of a binary language L we deﬁne C2ψ to be the set of (unordered) pairs of 
constants {ai, aj}, i = j, such that for some binary relation symbol Q of L, either ±Q(ai, aj) or ±Q(aj , ai)
appears in ψ.
We say that sentences φ, ψ such that C2φ and C2ψ are disjoint instantiate no pairs in common. Such 
sentences cannot reasonably be required to be independent outright because of information each may contain 
concerning single individuals, but they can be independent conditionally.
Strong Independence Principle (binary), BIP. Let L be a binary language and assume that φ, ψ ∈ QFSL
instantiate no pairs in common. Let b1, . . . , bs be the constants that φ and ψ have in common (if any) and 
let Δ(b1, . . . , bs) be a unary trace for these constants. Then
w(φ ∧ ψ |Δ) = w(φ |Δ) · w(ψ |Δ). (14)
If s = 0 (the sentences have no constants in common) then Δ = 
 (tautology), so BIP implies IP.
We shall now deﬁne the binary versions wY of the unary wx mentioned on page 19. Let DL be the set of 
all
Y = 〈x1, . . . , x2q ; y1, . . . , yp〉
such that xk, yj ≥ 0 and 
∑2q
k=1 xk = 1, and such that for any 1 ≤ k, c ≤ 2q,∑
j ∈A(k,c)
sjyj = 1 (15)
(A(k, c) was deﬁned on page 24). We intend to deﬁne wY so that these functions satisfy Ex, BIP, 
wY (βk(ai)) = xk and if γh is the atom (
k e
d c
)
and Γj its equivalence class – that is, Γj is (10) – then
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To this end, it is convenient to write j(h) for j such that γh ∈ Γj . To make the notation more manageable, 
we also write zh for yj(h). Hence the yj are associated with the equivalence classes Γj of atoms, and the zh
assign these same values to the individual atoms in these classes. In terms of the zh, (15) says that the sum 
over zh for those γh with a given unary trace is 1.
For a state description
Θ(a1, . . . , am) =
∧
1≤i≤m
βki(ai) ∧
∧
1≤i<t≤m
γhi,t(ai, at)
we deﬁne
wY (Θ(a1, . . . , am)) =
∏
1≤i≤m
xki
∏
1≤i<t≤m
zhi,t . (16)
Note that if σ ∈ Sm and
Ψ(a1, . . . , am) = Θ(aσ(1), . . . , aσ(m))
then7
Ψ(a1, . . . , am) =
∧
1≤i≤m
βkσ−1(i)(ai) ∧
∧
1≤i<t≤m
γhσ−1(i),σ−1(t)(ai, at),
the multiset {kσ−1(i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} equals the multiset {ki : 1 ≤ i ≤ m}, and the multisets {hσ−1(i),σ−1(t) :
1 ≤ i < t ≤ m}, {hi,t : 1 ≤ i < t ≤ m} can only diﬀer in that the former contains hi′,t′ in place of ht′,i′
when i′ = σ−1(i) > σ−1(t) = t′. We have γhi′,t′ ∼ γht′,i′ , i.e. they are in the same equivalence class Γj, 
hence zhi′,t′ = zht′,i′ (since both are yj for this j). Therefore
wY (Ψ) =
∏
1≤i≤m
xkσ−1(i)
∏
1≤i<t≤m
zhσ−1(i),σ−1(t) =
∏
1≤i≤m
xki
∏
1≤i<t≤m
zhi,t = wY (Θ).
Theorem 1. Let L be a binary language. The functions wY deﬁned above determine probability functions on 
SL that satisfy BEx and BIP (and hence also Ex and IP).
Furthermore, any probability function satisfying Ex and BIP is equal to wY for some Y .
Proof. w = wY clearly satisﬁes properties (i), (ii) from page 18. To show that it satisﬁes (iii), let 
Θ(a1, . . . , am) be as above. The Θ+(a1, . . . , am, am+1) which extend Θ(a1, . . . , am) have the form
Θ(a1, . . . , am) ∧ βc(am+1) ∧
m∧
i=1
γhi,m+1(ai, am+1) , (17)
where c is any of 1, . . . , 2q and the unary trace of γhi,m+1(x, y) is βki(x) ∧ βc(y).
The value of wY (Θ+) for Θ+ as in (17) is⎛
⎝ ∏
1≤i≤m
xki
⎞
⎠ xc
⎛
⎝ ∏
1≤i<t≤m
zhi,t
⎞
⎠( m∏
i=1
zhi,m+1
)
.
7 Recall the convention from page 22, needed below when σ−1(i) > σ−1(t).
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all the zhi,m+1 such that γhi,m+1 has trace βki(x) ∧ βc(y). So summing the wY (Θ+) successively over these 
hi,m+1 and then over c yields wY (Θ). Hence (iii) holds, too. It follows that wY extends to a probability 
function on SL which moreover, by the remark preceding the theorem, satisﬁes Ex.
A similar argument now shows that (16) remains valid even when we replace the a1, . . . , am by other 
distinct constants b1, . . . , bm (we sum the probabilities of state descriptions for a1, . . . , aM extending 
Θ(b1, . . . , bm), where M is suﬃciently large so that all the b1, . . . , bm are amongst the a1, . . . , aM ). Thus wY
satisﬁes BEx since the right hand side of (16) depends only on the signature of Θ.
To show BIP, we note that continuing with the same reasoning, we can show also that for a partial state 
description
Φ(b1, . . . , bm) =
∧
1≤i≤m
βki(bi) ∧
∧
{bi,bt}∈C
i<t
γhi,t(bi, bt) (18)
we have
wY (Φ(b1, . . . , bm)) =
∏
1≤i≤m
xki
∏
{bi,bt}∈C
i<t
zhi,t .
Assume that Φ and Ψ are some partial state descriptions which instantiate no pairs in common. Let 
b1, . . . , bs be the constants that Φ and Ψ have in common and let Δ be a unary trace for these constants. 
If Δ is not consistent with Φ or Ψ, then we clearly have
wY (Φ ∧ Ψ |Δ) = wY (Φ |Δ)wY (Ψ |Δ) (19)
because of the convention from page 17. So suppose Φ is as in (18), s ≤ m,
Ψ(b1, . . . , bs, bm+1, . . . , bm+n) =
∧
1≤i≤s
βki(bi) ∧
∧
m+1≤i≤m+n
βki(bi) ∧
∧
{bi,bt}∈D
i<t
γhi,t(bi, bt) (20)
where D is some set of 2-element subsets of {b1, . . . , bs, bm+1, . . . , bm+n}, D ∩ C = ∅, and
Δ(b1, . . . , bs) =
∧
1≤i≤s
βki(bi).
We can now use the above observation regarding values of wY for partial state descriptions to prove that 
(19) holds in this case, too, since both sides are
∏
s+1≤i≤m+n
xki
∏
{bi,bt}∈C∪D
i<t
zhi,t .
Hence BIP holds when φ, ψ are partial state descriptions.
To prove that (14) holds with general φ, ψ ∈ QFSL, note that any quantiﬁer free sentence φ(b1, . . . , bm) is 
equivalent to a disjunction of partial state descriptions Φu as in (18), with C = C2φ. Assume that ψ ∈ QFSL
instantiates no pairs in common with φ. Without loss of generality, let b1, . . . , bs be the constants that φ
and ψ have in common and bm+1, . . . , bm+n the remaining constants appearing in ψ. ψ is equivalent to a 
disjunction of partial state descriptions Ψf as in (20) where D = C2ψ, and so by the above, for any unary 
trace Δ for b1, . . . , bs,
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⎛
⎝∨
u
Φu ∧
∨
f
Ψf
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Δ
⎞
⎠ = ∑
u,f
wY ( Φu ∧ Ψf |Δ)
=
∑
u,f
wY (Φu | Δ) · wY (Ψf | Δ) =
∑
u
wY (Φu | Δ) ·
∑
f
wY (Ψf | Δ)
= wY
(∨
u
Φu
∣∣∣∣∣ Δ
)
· wY
⎛
⎝∨
f
Ψf
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Δ
⎞
⎠ = wY (φ |Δ) · wY (ψ |Δ),
as required.
For the ﬁnal part of the theorem, assume that w satisﬁes Ex and BIP. We deﬁne
xk = w(βk(ai))
and
yj(h) = zh = w(γh(ai, at) |βk(ai) ∧ βc(at))
where βk(x) ∧ βc(y) is the unary trace of γh(x, y). Note that by Ex, this deﬁnition is correct in that it does 
not matter which ai, at we take, and when j = j(h) = j(g) (that is, when γh ∼ γg), then zh = zg, and yj
is given the same value. Using BIP, we can check that with Y deﬁned in this way, wY equals w for state 
descriptions, and hence w = wY for all sentences. 
2.3. Representation theorem
We showed in Theorem 1 that the probability functions wY satisfy BEx. We now prove that the functions 
satisfying BEx are exactly the convex combinations of the wY functions in the following sense.
Theorem 2. Let w be a probability function for a binary language L satisfying BEx. Then there exists a 
(normalised, σ-additive) measure μ on the Borel subsets of DL such that for any θ ∈ SL,
w(θ) =
∫
DL
wY (θ) dμ(Y ). (21)
Conversely, for a given measure μ on the Borel subsets of DL, the function deﬁned by (21) is a probability 
function on SL satisfying BEx.
Proof. Let w be a probability function for L satisfying BEx. It suﬃces to prove (21) for state descriptions, 
the rest follows, for instance, as in Corollary 9.2 of [10]. The proof is based on the fact that for a state 
description Θ(b1, . . . , bm) and u > m
w(Θ(b1, . . . , bm)) =
∑
Ψ(b1,...,bm,bm+1,...,bu)|=Θ(b1,...,bm)
w(Ψ(b1, . . . , bm, bm+1, . . . , bu)) , (22)
and it proceeds via grouping state descriptions for u individuals according to their extended signature and 
counting their numbers.
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(
t
{ti : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}
)
=
(
t
t1, t2, . . . , tn
)
= t!
t1!t2! . . . tn!
.
Let u ∈ N+ and let ut = 〈u1, . . . , u2q ; t1, . . . , tp〉 be an extended signature on u. First, we wish to count 
the number of all state descriptions with this extended signature. Thinking about state descriptions in terms 
of u × u matrices as in (6), this involves placing, on the diagonal, the number 1 u1 times, the number 2 u2
times and so on. We are thus creating ukuc many spaces (when k = c) or uk(uk−1)2 many spaces in which to 
place atoms from the classes Γj, j ∈ A(k, c) (k = c) or j ∈ A(k, k) respectively. Once a place for an atom 
from a given Γj is chosen, no freedom remains over which atom from this class it is when k = c or when 
k = c and e = d (that is, when sj = 1). When k = c and e = d (i.e., when sj = 2), either one of the two 
atoms from this class can be chosen to ﬁll the place.
It follows that the number of state descriptions with extended signature ut, denoted by N (∅, ut), is
(
u
u1, . . . , u2q
) ∏
1≤k<c≤2q
(
ukuc
{tj : j ∈ A(k, c)}
)
×
∏
1≤k≤2q
⎛
⎝( uk(uk−1)2
{tj : j ∈ A(k, k)}
) ∏
j∈A(k,k)
s
tj
j
⎞
⎠ . (23)
Now let mn be an extended signature, m < u and let Θ(b1, . . . , bm) be a state description with this 
signature. Arguing similarly to above, we ﬁnd that the number of state descriptions with signature ut
extending Θ(b1, . . . , bm), denoted by N (mn, ut), is
(
u − m
u1 − m1, . . . , u2q − m2q
) ∏
1≤k<c≤2q
(
ukuc − mkmc
{tj − nj : j ∈ A(k, c)}
)
×
∏
1≤k≤2q
⎛
⎝( uk(uk−1)2 − mk(mk−1)2
{tj − nj : j ∈ A(k, k)}
) ∏
j∈A(k,k)
s
(tj−nj)
j
⎞
⎠ . (24)
We make the convention that our multinomial expression is 0 if any of the terms are negative. Note 
that the number calculated in (24) depends only on the signature mn and not on the particular choice of 
Θ(b1, . . . , bm).
We shall write w(mn) for w(Θ(b1, . . . , bm)); by BEx this is unambiguous. Let Sign(u) denote the set 
containing all extended signatures ut on u. From (22)
1 = w(
) =
∑
ut∈Sign(u)
N (∅, ut)w(ut),
w(mn) =
∑
ut∈Sign(u)
N (mn, ut) w(ut),
and hence
w(mn) =
∑
ut∈Sign(u)
N (mn, ut)
N (∅, ut) N (∅, u
t) w(ut). (25)
We shall show that
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(N (mn, ut)
N (∅, ut)
)
−
⎛
⎝ ∏
1≤k≤2q
(uk
u
)mk ∏
1≤k<c≤2q
⎛
⎝ ∏
j∈A(k,c)
(
tj
ukuc
)nj⎞⎠
×
∏
1≤k≤2q
⎛
⎝ ∏
j∈A(k,k)
⎛
⎝ tjs−1j(
uk(uk−1)
2
)
⎞
⎠
nj⎞⎠
⎞
⎠
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (26)
is of the order O
(√
u
−1) (independently of u1, . . . , u2q , t1, . . . , tp). We make a convention that if some 
uk = 0 or some tj = 0 then terms involving these are missing from the product above.
First, let mk ≤ uk and nj ≤ tj for every j, k, so that none of the terms in (24) are negative. The term (
N (mn,ut)
N (∅,ut)
)
in (26) can be written as
⎛
⎝ ∏
1≤k≤2q
(uk
u
)mk ∏
1≤k<c≤2q
⎛
⎝ ∏
j∈A(k,c)
(
tj
ukuc
)nj⎞⎠ ∏
1≤k≤2q
⎛
⎝ ∏
j∈A(k,k)
⎛
⎝ tjs−1j(
uk(uk−1)
2
)
⎞
⎠
nj⎞⎠
⎞
⎠ (27)
×
∏
1≤k≤2q
∏
0≤i≤mk−1
(
1 − i u−1k
)
∏
0≤l≤m−1 (1 − l u−1)
(28)
×
∏
1≤k<c≤2q
⎛
⎝∏j∈A(k,c)∏0≤i≤nj−1 (1 − i t−1j )∏
0≤l≤mkmc−1
(
1 − l (ukuc)−1
)
⎞
⎠ (29)
×
∏
1≤k≤2q
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∏
j∈A(k,k)
∏
0≤i≤nj−1
(
1 − i t−1j
)
∏
0≤l≤(mk(mk−1)/2)−1
(
1 − l
(
uk(uk−1)
2
)−1)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ . (30)
Let P stand for the product of (28), (29) and (30).
We observe that P is bounded by a constant independent of u, the uk and the tj . For example,
(28) <
(
1
1 − (m − 1)m−1
)m
since (28) can be split into the product of m fractions, each numerator is at most 1, and the least denominator 
is (1 − (m − 1)u−1), and similarly for (29) and (30).
Furthermore, we need only to consider those k where mk > 0 in the limit of (26) since otherwise nj = 0
for j ∈ A(k, c) and factors involving corresponding uk, tj cancel out from N (mn,ut)N (∅,ut) , and they are all 1 in the 
product which is being subtracted.
We shall prove the claim about (26) by cases. Consider ﬁrst the case that for some k with mk > 0 we 
have uk ≤
√
u. Then
∏
1≤k≤2q
(uk
u
)mk ≤ (√u)−1,
each of the other products in (27) is at most 1, so (26) = | (27) · (1 − P ) | = O(√u−1). A similar argument 
works if uk >
√
u for every k with mk > 0 but for some j we have nj > 0 and tj ≤
√
u.
The second case is when for every k such that mk > 0, uk >
√
u and for every j with nj > 0, tj >
√
u. 
In this case, P is close to 1. To see this, note that (28) can be written as a product of m fractions of the 
form 1−αuk
−1
−1 , α, β ∈ {1, . . . , m} and that the distance of each fraction from 1 is1−βu
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∣∣∣∣ < 2 (βu−1 + αuk−1) < 2√u−1 (α + β) ≤ 4m√u−1.
Hence (28) is 1 + O
(√
u
−1). A similar argument works for the other two products, (29) and (30), so P is 
1 + O
(√
u
−1). It follows that (26) is again of order O (√u−1).
Now suppose uk < mk for some k (the case when uk > mk for every k but some j is such that tj < nj is 
similar). Note that then N (mn,ut)N (∅,ut) = 0. In addition, mk > 0 and uk <
√
u, so arguing as above (27) would 
be of order O(√u−1) and consequently so would (26), which exhausts all cases.
Deﬁne Yut by
xk =
uk
u
, yj =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
tj
ukuc
for j ∈ A(k, c), uk, uc = 0, k < c,
tjsj
−1(
uk(uk−1)
2
) for j ∈ A(k, k), uk = 0, 1,
0 otherwise.
(31)
In what follows, we will write wut for wYut . Note that wut(mn) is equal to (27).
We shall now employ methods from Nonstandard Analysis, particularly Loeb Measure Theory [8,4] to 
complete the proof. An alternative classical proof may be found in [11, Chapter 5].
Let U∗ be a nonstandard ω1-saturated elementary extension of a suﬃciently large portion U of the set 
theoretic universe containing w. As usual, c∗ denotes the image in U∗ of c ∈ U where these diﬀer. Working 
now in U∗, let u ∈ N∗ be nonstandard. Then (from (25)) we still have
w∗(mn) =
∑
ut∈Sign∗(u)
N ∗(mn, ut)
N ∗(∅, ut ) N
∗(∅, ut ) w∗(ut ). (32)
Loeb Measure Theory enables us to conclude from (32) that for some σ-additive measure μ′ on Sign∗(u)
we have (for all standard extended signatures mn)
w(mn) =
∫
Sign∗(u)
◦(N ∗(mn, ut )
N ∗(∅, ut )
)
dμ′(ut ) . (33)
Since, in U , (26) is O
(√
u
−1), this gives
w(mn) =
∫
Sign∗(u)
◦(w∗
ut
(mn)
)
dμ′(ut ) . (34)
Moreover, ◦
(
w∗
ut
(mn)
)
equals w(◦(Yut))(mn). So deﬁning μ on the Borel subsets A of DL by
μ(A) = μ′
{
ut | ◦(Yut) = 〈◦x1, . . . , ◦x2q ; ◦y1, . . . , ◦yp〉 ∈ A
}
where the xk, yj are as deﬁned in (31), means (34) becomes (using, for example, Proposition 1, Chapter 15 
of [13])
w(mn) =
∫
DL
wY (mn) dμ(Y ),
as required.
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Dominated Convergence Theorem it also satisﬁes P3. So it is a probability function. This function satisﬁes 
BEx because all the wY do. 
We shall now use the above representation theorem to show that the wY functions, which by Theorem 1
are the only probability functions satisfying BIP and Ex, can be characterised alternatively as the only 
probability functions satisfying IP and BEx. The fact that the wY satisfy BEx and IP follows from Theorem 1
and the other part follows from the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let w be a probability function on SL satisfying BEx and IP. Then w is equal to wY for some 
Y ∈ DL.
Proof.8 Let μ be the σ-additive normalised measure guaranteed to exist by Theorem 2 such that
w =
∫
DL
wY dμ(Y ) .
Let θ(b1, . . . , bm) ∈ QFSL and let θ′ be the result of replacing each bi in θ by bi+m. By IP and since 
w(θ) = w(θ′) by (B)Ex, we have
0 = 2 (w(θ ∧ θ′) − w(θ) · w(θ′))
=
∫
DL
wY (θ ∧ θ′) dμ(Y ) +
∫
DL
w Y ′(θ ∧ θ′) dμ( Y ′)
− 2
⎛
⎝∫
DL
wY (θ) dμ(Y )
⎞
⎠ ·
⎛
⎝∫
DL
w Y ′(θ
′) dμ( Y ′)
⎞
⎠
=
∫
DL
wY (θ) · wY (θ′) dμ(Y ) +
∫
DL
w Y ′(θ) · w Y ′(θ′) dμ( Y ′)
− 2
⎛
⎝∫
DL
wY (θ) dμ(Y )
⎞
⎠ ·
⎛
⎝∫
DL
w Y ′(θ
′) dμ( Y ′)
⎞
⎠
=
∫
DL
∫
DL
(
wY (θ) − w Y ′(θ′)
)2
dμ(Y ) dμ( Y ′).
It follows that there exists a subset A of DL with μ measure 1 such that wY (θ) as a function of Y is 
constant on A for every θ ∈ QFSL, see e.g. [11, Chapter 5] for details. Therefore, for any Y ∈ A we must 
have that w and wY are equal for quantiﬁer-free sentences and hence for all sentences, as required. 
2.4. Binary instantial relevance
In this section we consider how the idea of instantial relevance might be captured in our atom-based 
binary context. Assuming that the available evidence is in the form of a partial state description, the 
evidence may be extended to another partial state description either by adding unary information about 
8 We use the method of the proof of [10, Theorem 20.6].
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may not be new. In each of these cases, if we have already learnt (and added to the evidence) the same 
information about another individual or pair of individuals, it should enhance our probability that this 
information will be learnt about the given individual or pair of individuals too.
Adding unary information about a single constant does not involve any intricacies, and instantial relevance 
amounts to requiring that for a partial state description Δ(a1, . . . , am) and any βk,
w(βk(am+2) |Δ) ≤ w(βk(am+2) |βk(am+1) ∧ Δ). (35)
Adding an atom instantiated by some constants b1, b2 is more complicated, since such sentences are 
already determined to some degree by Δ when one or both of b1, b2 are amongst the a1, . . . , am. More 
precisely, assume that
γh(b1, b2) ∧ Δ(a1, . . . , am)
is consistent and that βk(x) ∧ βc(y) is the unary trace of γh(x, y). Then Δ(a1, . . . , am) may already imply 
γh(b1, b2), or imply only βk(b1) ∧βc(b2), or only βk(b1), or only βc(b2), or none of these. According to which 
of these holds, we deﬁne the Extra in γh(b1, b2) over Δ(a1, . . . , am) to be, in order,
∅, {{1, 2}}, {{1, 2}, {2}}, {{1, 2}, {1}}, {{1, 2}, {1}, {2}}
respectively. Clearly, conditional probabilities of instantiated atoms given partial state descriptions should 
only be compared if the Extra in them over the evidence is the same.
Binary Principle of Instantial Relevance. Let Δ(a1, . . . , am) be a partial state description. Then (35) holds 
for any βk. Furthermore, if γh is an atom and b1, b2, b′1, b′2 are constants such that Δ ∧γh(b1, b2) ∧γh(b′1, b′2)
is consistent and the Extras in γh(b1, b2) over Δ ∧ γ(b′1, b′2), in γh(b1, b2) over Δ and in γh(b′1, b′2) over Δ
are all the same then
w(γh(b1, b2) |Δ) ≤ w(γh(b1, b2) |Δ ∧ γh(b′1, b′2)) . (36)
Theorem 4. Let w be a probability function on SL satisfying BEx. Then w satisﬁes the Binary Principle of 
Instantial Relevance.
Proof. First, note that every wY satisﬁes (35) and (36) with equality by the deﬁnition of these functions. 
This is the case since
wY (Δ ∧ βk(am+2)) = wY (Δ) · xk ,
wY (Δ ∧ βk(am+2) ∧ βk(am+1)) = wY (Δ) · x2k ,
and, for example, when the above Extra is {{1, 2}, {2}} and the unary trace of γh(x, y) is βk(x) ∧ βc(y), 
then
w(Δ ∧ γh(b1, b2)) = w(Δ ∧ γh(b′1, b′2)) = w(Δ) · zh · xc ,
w(Δ ∧ γh(b1, b2) ∧ γ(b′1, b′2)) = w(Δ) · z2h · x2c .
By Theorem 2, since w satisﬁes BEx, w is an integral of the wY . Let μ be the corresponding measure. 
Then (35) and any instance of (36) become
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⎝∫
DL
f(Y )wY (Δ) dμ(Y )
⎞
⎠
2
≤
⎛
⎝∫
DL
(f(Y ))2wY (Δ)dμ(Y )
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝∫
DL
wY (Δ)dμ(Y )
⎞
⎠
for some function f (in the above cases, f(Y ) is xk or zhxc respectively), and this integral inequality holds 
for any f , as required. 
We remark that the same method yields the following related result:
Theorem 5. Let w be a probability function on SL satisfying BEx. Let Δ(a1, . . . , am) be a partial state 
description. If γh is an atom and b1, b2, b′1, b′2 are constants such that Δ ∧ γh(b1, b2) ∧ γh(b′1, b′2) is consistent 
and the Extra in γh(b′1, b′2) over Δ is the same as the Extra in γh(b1, b2) over Δ ∧ γ(b′1, b′2) then
w(γh(b′1, b′2) |Δ) ≤ w(γh(b1, b2) |Δ ∧ γh(b′1, b′2)) . (37)
2.5. Binary Suﬃcientness Postulate
Finally, we turn our attention to disregarding irrelevant information. A classical principle in the unary 
case is Johnson’s Suﬃcientness Postulate (see page 19). This principle says that the conditional probability 
of a new constant satisfying an atom, given a state description, should not depend on what the other atoms 
in the state description do, only on how many constants the state description is about and how many of 
them satisfy this very same atom.
An earlier attempt at generalising Johnson’s Suﬃcientness Postulate to the binary context was made in 
[14], but it proved very restrictive in the sense that only two probability functions satisﬁed it. This earlier 
approach was not based on atoms, but rather focused on the conditional probability of a full state description 
for a1, . . . , am+1 given a full state description for a1, . . . , am. Such an approach corresponds to assuming that 
an agent learns about the world through successively encountering new individuals and learning everything 
about each of them – including all their connections to all individuals encountered previously – in one go.
However, suppose instead that the agent only learns all about (one or) two individuals at a time and 
learns nothing about their connections to other individuals. That is, the agent is always focusing on (at 
most) two individuals at any one time. The fact that the agent’s language is binary makes this a plausible 
assumption. Then it is clear that the evidence should be a partial state description, and that we need to 
consider the conditional probability of an instantiated atom – some γh(au, av), or a 1-atom – some βk(au).
Furthermore, for a partial state description
Δ(a1, . . . , am) =
∧
1≤i≤m
βki(ai) ∧
∧
{ai,at}∈C
i<t
γhi,t(ai, at) ,
the probability of an extension of it by some βk(am+1) (how a new individual behaves in isolation), should 
arguably depend only on the βki (how other individuals behave in isolation), rather than on the γhi,t. An 
extension of Δ by some γh(au, av) for 1 ≤ u < v ≤ m, {au, av} /∈ C (how au and av relate to each other 
given how each of them behaves in isolation), should depend only on those γhi,t where ai and at behave in 
isolation just as au and av do.
Accordingly, we broaden the notion of the extended signature of a state description to partial state 
descriptions. We deﬁne the extended signature of Δ as above, to be the vector 〈m1, . . . , m2q ; n1, . . . , np〉, 
where mk is the number of times that k appears amongst the ki and nj is the number of 〈i, t〉 such that 
{ai, at} ∈ C and γhi,t ∈ Γj .
Recall that j(h) denotes the j for which γh ∈ Γj and A(k, c) denotes the set of all j = j(h) such that the 
unary trace of γh(x, y) is βk(x) ∧ βc(y). The extended signature of Δ still satisﬁes
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k=1
mk = m, (38)
but the sums of nj for j ∈ A(k, c) or A(k, k) no longer need to be as in (12), (13) and we deﬁne
∑
j∈A(k,c)
nj = nk,c
∑
j∈A(k,k)
nj = nk,k .
Note that nk,c = nc,k.
Taking our argument further along the lines of the Unary Johnson’s Suﬃcientness Postulate, we are led 
to the requirement that
• the conditional probability of βk(am+1) given Δ should depend only on mk and m,
and noting that for j ∈ A(ku, kv) there are sj (that is, 1 or 2) atoms γh in Γj such that γh(au, av) is 
consistent with Δ (because the unary trace is ﬁxed), we further require that
• for 1 ≤ u < v ≤ m, j ∈ A(ku, kv) and γh ∈ Γj, the conditional probability of γh(au, av) given Δ should 
depend only on nj, sj and nku,kv .
The (atom-based) Binary Suﬃcientness Postulate consists of the two requirements above.
Employing Theorem 5, a special case of which is quoted and used in [15], it is possible to show – see [15]
– that the unique regular9 probability functions w satisfying Ex and this principle, are those for which the 
above conditional probabilities satisfy
w(βk(am+1) |Δ) =
mk + μ2q
m + μ , w(γh(au, av) |Δ) =
nj
sj
+ λ22q2
nku,kv + λ
for some 0 < μ, λ ≤ ∞.
3. An atom-based approach for polyadic languages
For the rest of this paper, we assume again that L is a language with relation symbols R1, . . . , Rq of 
arities r1, . . . , rq. Moreover, we assume that it is r-ary for some r > 1, so the maximum of the ri is r.
The atoms of L are the state formulae for r variables. We denote them by10
γ1(x1, . . . , xr), . . . , γN (x1, . . . , xr) .
As in the binary case, state descriptions for at least r constants can be expressed as a conjunction of 
(instantiated) atoms,
Θ(b1, . . . , bm) =
∧
1<i1<...<ir≤m
γhi1,...,ir (bi1 , . . . , bir ) . (39)
Clearly, we have γhi1,...,ir (bi1 , . . . , bir ) = Θ[bi1 , . . . , bir ]; these sentences express all the information con-
tained in Θ that involves bi1 , . . . , bir and no other constants. Polyadic atoms thus again act as the basic 
9 Regular probability functions are those that give all state descriptions non-zero probabilities.
10 Note that N (as well as the Ng deﬁned below) depend on L.
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play this role, since the language is r-ary.
Even so, we will ﬁnd it convenient to have a way of referring to blocks smaller than atoms.
Deﬁnition. The g-atoms for g ≤ r are the state formulae of L for g variables. They are denoted by
γg1 (x1, . . . , xg), . . . , γ
g
Ng
(x1, . . . , xg) .
Thus the γrh(x1, . . . , xr) are just the atoms γh(x1, . . . , xr) and Nr = N . Note that in the binary case 
there are the γ2h = γh (the binary atoms) and the γ1k (1-atoms), which we referred to as βk in the previous 
section to avoid superscripts altogether.
Every state description for at least r constants can be expressed as a conjunction (39). Conversely, 
such a conjunction is consistent (and hence deﬁnes a state description) just when any pair of the 
γhi1,...,ir (bi1 , . . . , bir ) agree when restricted to the constants they have in common. We will ﬁnd it useful to 
make these shared components visible so we write
Θ(b1, . . . , bm) =
∧
1≤s≤r
∧
1≤i1<...<is≤m
γshi1,...,is (bi1 , . . . , bis) . (40)
This works even when m < r. Note that the γshi1,...,is are such that
γshi1,...,is (bi1 , . . . , bis) = Θ[bi1 , . . . , bis ].
Let g < r. The following deﬁnition is motivated by the need to isolate the part of a state description in 
which at most g constants are brought together instantiating a relation. We refer to this part as the g-ary 
trace of the state description. More precisely,
Deﬁnition. The g-ary trace of the state description (40), denoted by
(Θ  g)(b1, . . . , bm),
or sometimes simply (Θ  g), is deﬁned to be
∧
1≤s≤g
∧
1≤i1<...<is≤m
γshi1,...,is (bi1 , . . . , bis) . (41)
Note that this agrees with the deﬁnition of the unary trace we made in the previous section (on page 
22). Any consistent conjunction of the form (41) is called a g-ary trace for the constants b1, . . . , bm.
Partial state descriptions are composed of instantiated s-atoms in a similar way to state descriptions, 
but the sentences do not necessarily combine to give a full state description.
Deﬁnition. A partial state description for b1, . . . , bm is a sentence of the form
Δ(b1, . . . , bm) =
∧
1≤s≤r
∧
{bi1 ,...,bis }∈Cs
i1<...<is
γshi1,...,is (bi1 , . . . , bis) , (42)
where Cs is some set of s-element subsets of {b1, . . . , bm}.
We will assume that (42), like (40), displays all the instantiated γsh implied by Δ. In other words, we 
assume that 
⋃r
Cs contains along with any {bi1 , . . . , bis}, also all its subsets.s=1
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actually appear in it, so C1 contains all singletons {bi} for i = 1, . . . , m. We remark also that a partial state 
description (42) is a state description just when Cr contains all r-element subsets of {b1, . . . , bm}. Note that 
any g-ary trace of a state description is a partial state description.
We deﬁne the g-ary trace of a state formula, and a partial state formula analogously to the deﬁnitions 
for state descriptions.
3.1. Polyadic signatures
As in the binary case, we need to introduce an equivalence between atoms (and more generally, between 
g-atoms) to capture the fact that g-atoms obtained from each other by permuting the variables represent 
the same thing.
Accordingly, we deﬁne γgh ∼ γgk if there exists a permutation σ ∈ Sg such that
γgh(x1, . . . , xg) ≡ γgk(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(g)) (43)
and we denote the equivalence classes of ∼ by Γg1, . . . , Γgpg . When g = r we drop the superscript and write 
just Γ1, . . . ,Γp, and we write p for pr. If (43) holds, we say that γgh obtains from γ
g
k via σ. Note that the 
equivalence classes Γ1j are singletons and p1 = N1 = 2q, so they are not necessary and we can work with 
the γ1k instead, as we did with the βk in the previous section, for r = 2.
We extend the deﬁnition of a signature from binary languages to r-ary languages for r > 2 in the obvious 
way:
Deﬁnition. The signature of a state description Θ as in (39) (or (40)) is deﬁned to be the vector 〈n1, . . . , np〉, 
where nj is the number of 〈i1, . . . , ir〉 such that 1 ≤ i1 < . . . < ir ≤ m and γhi1,...,ir ∈ Γj .
Thus, the signature records how many atoms from each equivalence class there are within Θ(b1, . . . , bm). 
When m < r, the signature is not deﬁned, but the notion of extended signature still makes sense, where the 
extended signature of Θ as in (40) is the vector
〈n11, . . . , n1p1 ; . . . ; nr−11 , . . . , nr−1pr−1 ; n1, . . . , np〉 ,
and ngj is the number of 〈i1, . . . , ig〉 such that 1 ≤ i1 < . . . < ig ≤ m and γghi1,...,ig ∈ Γ
g
j . Note that the 
extended signature is derivable from the signature (when m ≥ r) and that it is deﬁned even when m < r.
Signature Exchangeability Principle, Sgx. The probability of a state description depends only on its signa-
ture.
Sgx for L unary or binary is the same as Ex or BEx respectively. Sgx implies Ex but the converse 
implication does not hold in general. We gave an example of a probability function satisfying Ex but not 
Sgx (BEx) for r = 2 in the previous section.
3.2. Polyadic independence
The following deﬁnition aims to capture exactly which sets of g constants are brought together instanti-
ating a relation within a sentence:
Deﬁnition. For a sentence φ(b1, . . . , bm) ∈ SL we deﬁne Csφ to be the set of all sets {bk1 , . . . , bks} with s
elements such that all of bk1 , . . . , bks appear in some ±Rd(bi1 , . . . , bir ), d ∈ {1, . . . , q} featuring in φ.d
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one binary relation symbol R1 and one ternary relation symbol R2. For
φ = R1(a7, a2) ∨ R2(a4, a2, a4)
we have C1φ = {{a2}, {a7}, {a4}}, C2φ = {{a2, a7}, {a2, a4}} and Ckφ = ∅ for k ≥ 3. Note that 
⋃r
s=1 C
s
φ is 
closed under taking subsets.
A modiﬁcation of the Disjunctive Normal Form Theorem yields the following lemma:
Lemma 6. Let φ(b1, . . . , bm) ∈ QFSL. Then φ(b1, . . . , bm) is equivalent to a disjunction of partial state 
descriptions as in (42), with Cs = Csφ for s = 1, . . . , r.
We are now in a position to formulate a general version of the Independence Principle from page 19 based 
on atoms, as we did on page 26 for r = 2. In this generalised version we require that the following holds 
for any g < r: if two quantiﬁer free sentences have no (g + 1)-sets of constants in common then they are 
conditionally independent given a g-ary trace for the constants that they share.
Strong Independence Principle, SIP. Let L be an r-ary language and let 0 ≤ g < r. Assume that φ, ψ ∈ QFSL
are such that
Cg+1φ ∩ Cg+1ψ = ∅
and let b1, . . . , bt be the constants that φ and ψ have in common (if any). Let Δ be a g-ary trace for the 
constants b1, . . . , bt when t > 0, and Δ = 
 (tautology) if φ and ψ have no constants in common. Then
w(φ ∧ ψ |Δ) = w(φ |Δ) · w(ψ |Δ) .
The Basic SIP Functions. Recall that for g ≤ r, Ng is the number of g-atoms and pg is the number of 
equivalence classes of g-atoms under ∼.
We will need a concept generalising the sj deﬁned in the binary context on page 24. For 1 < g ≤ r, every 
Γgj can be split into subclasses, each subclass containing all γ
g
h with the same (g − 1)-ary trace. Deﬁne sgj
to be the number of elements in these subclasses (given g and j, these subclasses of Γgj all have the same 
number of elements). In the binary case, we wrote just sj for s2j . Thus s
g
j expresses in how many ways the 
(g − 1)-ary trace of some/any γgh from Γgj can be extended to a γgk ∈ Γgj ; one of these ways is to γgh itself 
but there may be other possibilities. Furthermore, we deﬁne sg to be the total number of g-atoms with a 
given (g − 1)-ary trace. Note that this is independent of the trace chosen, and that for any given (g− 1)-ary 
trace, sg is the sum of the sgj over the j for which Γ
g
j contains an atom with this trace.
Example. Let r = 3 and let L have just one ternary relation symbol R. Let γ(x1, x2, x3) be the atom
3∧
i,j=1
R(x1, xi, xj) ∧
3∧
i,j=1
¬R(x2, xi, xj) ∧
3∧
i,j=1
¬R(x3, xi, xj) .
The class Γ3j that γ belongs to has three elements and s3j = 1. If we obtain γ′ by changing ¬R(x2, x1, x3) in 
γ to R(x2, x1, x3) (leaving the rest as in γ) then the class Γ3f that γ′ belongs to has 6 elements and s3f = 2. 
The number s3 is 26.
Let Y = 〈y11 , . . . , y1p ; y21 , . . . , y2p ; . . . ; yr1, . . . , yrp 〉 be a vector of real numbers such that1 2 r
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p1∑
j=1
y1j = 1,
and such that for 1 < g ≤ r the following holds: For any (g − 1)-ary trace ψ for x1, . . . , xg,
∑
j
sgj y
g
j = 1 (44)
where the sum is taken over those j ∈ {1, . . . , pg} for which Γgj contains some γgh with the (g−1)-ary trace ψ.
We use DL to denote the set of vectors satisfying the above conditions. In a bid to keep our formulae 
simpler, we will write
zgh = y
g
j(h)
where j(h) is that j for which γgh ∈ Γgj . Note that (44) is the same as requiring
∑
(γgh g−1)=ψ
zgh = 1 . (45)
The vectors Y ∈ DL play a similar role in the polyadic to the role the vectors x ∈ D2q from wx play in the 
unary. For a given Y , the corresponding function wY assigns a state description Θ(b1, . . . , bm) the probability 
of obtaining it by the following process: First the γ1h are chosen for b1, . . . , bm, independently according to 
the probabilities z1h. Then the γ2h are chosen for bi1 , bi2 with i1 < i2 from amongst the eligible ones, i.e. 
from amongst those γ2h for which (γ2h  1)(x1, x2) ≡ γ1hi1 (x1) ∧ γ
1
hi2
(x2), independently and according to the 
probabilities z2h, and so on. Note that this works by virtue of (45), because when choosing γ
g
h for bi1 , . . . , big , 
(γgh  g − 1) is determined.
More formally, given Y as above, for a state description Θ(a1, . . . , am) such that
Θ(a1, . . . , am) ≡
∧
1≤s≤r
1≤i1<...<is≤m
γshi1,...,is (ai1 , . . . , ais) (46)
we deﬁne
wY (Θ(a1, . . . , am)) =
∏
1≤s≤r
1≤i1<...<is≤m
zshi1,...,is . (47)
Note that, as in the binary case, if σ ∈ Sm and Ψ(a1, . . . , am) = Θ(aσ(1), . . . , aσ(m)) then wY (Θ) = wY (Ψ).
Theorem 7. The functions wY determine probability functions that satisfy Sgx and SIP (and hence also Ex 
and IP).
Furthermore, any probability function satisfying Ex and SIP is equal to wY for some Y .
Proof. To show that wY determines a probability function note that (i) and (ii) from page 18 clearly hold. 
For (iii), we will prove that for any state description Θ(a1, . . . , am) we have
wY (Θ(a1, . . . , am)) =
∑
Θ+(a1,...,am,am+1)|=Θ(a1,...,am)
wY (Θ
+(a1, . . . , am, am+1)) .
Let Θ+(a1, . . . , am, am+1) extend Θ. Then w (Θ+(a1, . . . , am, am+1)) is the productY
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⎜⎜⎝ ∏
1≤s≤r
1≤i1<...<is≤m
zshi1,...,is
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ ∏
1≤s≤r
1≤i1<...<is−1≤m
zshi1,...,is−1,(m+1)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
where the ﬁrst product is as for Θ and hi1,...,is−1,(m+1) is that h for which
γsh(ai1 , . . . , ais−1 , am+1) = Θ+[ai1 , . . . , ais−1 , am+1] .
That is, where Θ+ is
Θ(a1, . . . , am) ∧
∧
1≤s≤r
1≤i1<...<is−1≤m
γshi1,...,is−1,(m+1)
(ai1 , . . . , ais−1 , am+1). (48)
Consider some r-tuple 〈i1, . . . , ir−1, (m + 1)〉 with 1 ≤ i1 < . . . < ir−1 ≤ m. If some Θ+ |= Θ satisﬁes
Θ+[ai1 , . . . , air−1 , am+1] = γrh(ai1 , . . . , air−1 , am+1) ,
then any conjunction that diﬀers from (48) only by having γrk(ai1 , . . . , air−1 , am+1) in place of γrh(ai1 , . . . ,
air−1 , am+1), where γrh and γrk have the same (r−1)-ary trace, is also a state description extending Θ. Since 
the zrk for all such k sum to 1 (from (45)), we can sum them out. Similarly, we can deal with the other 
r-tuples, then the (r − 1)-tuples and so on, working our way down.
Similar reasoning gives us that (47) holds even when a1, . . . , am are replaced by any other distinct 
constants b1, . . . , bm and hence wY satisﬁes Sgx, and that we have an analogous formula for the probability 
of partial state descriptions:
wY
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ ∧
1≤s≤r
∧
{i1,...,is}∈Cs
i1<...<is
γshi1,...,is (bi1 , . . . , bis)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ = ∏
1≤s≤r
∏
{i1,...,is}∈Cs
i1<...<is
zshi1,...,is .
Using this, SIP is ﬁrst seen to hold for partial state descriptions Φ, Ψ, and then employing Lemma 6, in 
general. We omit the details.
To prove the last part of the theorem, assume that w satisﬁes Ex and SIP. We deﬁne Y by
ygj(h) = z
g
h = w(γ
g
h(a1, . . . , ag) | (γgh  g − 1)(a1, . . . , ag))
where γgh ∈ Γgj and (γgh  g − 1)(a1, . . . , ag) stands for a tautology when g = 1. Note that by Ex it does not 
matter which γgh from Γ
g
j we take, and that (44) must hold. Writing any state description in the form (46)
and using Ex and SIP, we can show by induction (adding the conjuncts for increasing numbers of constants 
one by one) that its probability is given by (47). 
Corollary 8. Let L be an r-ary language and let μ be a normalised σ-additive measure on the Borel subsets 
of DL. For any θ ∈ SL deﬁne
w(θ) =
∫
DL
wY (θ) dμ(Y ). (49)
Then the function w is a probability function on SL satisfying Sgx.
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Dominated Convergence Theorem for (P3). 
However, whether or not the converse to Corollary 8 holds, that is, whether any probability function 
satisfying Sgx can be expressed in the form (49) remains to be investigated.11
3.3. Polyadic PIR and JSP
For a general r-ary language, instantial relevance based on atoms can be captured similarly to the binary 
case. To do this, we ﬁrst generalise the concept of Extra to describe how much information a g-atom 
instantiated by b1, . . . , bg adds to a partial state description.
Let
Δ(a1, . . . , am) =
∧
1≤s≤r
∧
{ai1 ,...,ais}∈Cs
i1<...<is
γshi1,...,is (ai1 , . . . , ais) (50)
be a partial state description. Recall that 
⋃r
s=1 C
s is assumed to be closed under taking subsets. Let 
b1, . . . , bg be distinct constants, some of which may be amongst a1, . . . , am. Assume that γgh(b1, . . . , bg) is 
consistent with Δ.
Deﬁnition. The Extra in γgh(b1, . . . , bg) over Δ is the set E of those subsets {t1, . . . , ts} of {1, . . . , g} such 
that {bt1 , . . . , bts} is not in 
⋃r
s=1 C
s.
Note that E is empty just if Δ(a1, . . . , am) implies γgh(b1, . . . , bg), otherwise {1, . . . , g} is in E. E contains 
the singleton {i} just when bi is a new constant not featuring in Δ. E is the whole power set of {1, . . . , g} when 
all of b1, . . . , bg are new. The Extra is closed under supersets, and the additional information in γgh(b1, . . . , bg)
over Δ consists of all ±Rd(bi1 , . . . , bird ) implied by γ
g
h(b1, . . . , bg) and such that {i1, . . . , ird} ∈ E.
Polyadic Principle of Instantial Relevance, PPIR. Let Δ(a1, . . . , am) be a partial state description, 1 ≤ g ≤
r, and let γgh be a g-atom. Let b1, . . . , bg, b′1, . . . , b′g be such that
Δ ∧ γgh(b1, . . . , bg) ∧ γgh(b′1, . . . , b′g)
is consistent. Assume that the Extras in γgh(b1, . . . , bg) over Δ ∧ γgh(b′1, . . . , b′g), in γgh(b1, . . . , bg) over Δ and 
in γgh(b′1, . . . , b′g) over Δ are all the same. Then
w(γgh(b1, . . . , bg) |Δ) ≤ w(γgh(b1, . . . , bg) |Δ ∧ γgh(b′1, . . . , b′g)) . (51)
Theorem 9. Any convex combination (or integral) of the functions wY satisﬁes PPIR.
Proof. Let Δ, γgh and b1, . . . , bg, b′1, . . . , b′g be as in the statement of PPIR. Assume Δ is as in (50). Let E
be the Extra in γgh(b1, . . . , bg) over Δ. We have
wY (Δ) =
∏
1≤s≤r
∏
{ai1 ,...,ais }∈Cs
i1<...<is
zshi1,...,is ,
wY (Δ ∧ γgh(b1, . . . , bg)) = wY (Δ ∧ γgh(b′1, . . . , b′g)) = wY (Δ) ·
∏
{t1,...,ts}∈E
zskt1,...,ts ,
11 For an explanation why the method used for the binary proof fails in the polyadic case, see [11, Chapter 6].
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⎛
⎝ ∏
{t1,...,ts}∈E
zskt1,...,ts
⎞
⎠
2
.
It follows that for w = wY , (51) holds with equality.
The proof for w deﬁned by (49), and hence also for any convex combination of the wY , follows from the 
above equations exactly as in the binary case. 
By the same method we also obtain that under the same assumptions as those in PPIR except that 
merely the Extras in γgh(b1, . . . , bg) over Δ ∧ γgh(b′1, . . . , b′g) and in γgh(b′1, . . . , b′g) over Δ are required to be 
the same, we obtain that any convex combination (or integral) w of the functions wY satisﬁes
w(γgh(b
′
1, . . . , b
′
g) |Δ) ≤ w(γgh(b1, . . . , bg) |Δ ∧ γgh(b′1, . . . , b′g)) .
We now address irrelevance. Searching for a polyadic variant of JSP, we are again led to consider the 
conditional probability of some γgh(b1, . . . , bg) given a partial state description Δ(a1, . . . , am) as in (50). For 
1 < g ≤ r, we will require the partial state description to be (g − 1)-complete, that is, Cg−1 contains all the 
(g − 1)-element subsets of {a1, . . . , am}. In other words, Δ implies a state description for any (g − 1)-tuple 
of constants from amongst the a1, . . . , am.12 Furthermore, we will require that the Extra in γgh(b1, . . . , bg)
over Δ contains just the set {1, 2, . . . , g}, that is, either g = 1 and we consider the conditional probability of 
a 1-atom instantiated by a new constant, or g > 1 and we consider the conditional probability of a g-atom 
instantiated by constants already appearing in the evidence.
These conditions held in the binary case (that is, when r = 2) considered in the previous section. For a 
general r, we propose the following generalisation of the Binary Suﬃcientness Postulate:
The Polyadic Suﬃcientness Postulate. Let Δ(a1, . . . , am) be a partial state description as in (50).
(i) w(γ1h(am+1) | Δ) depends only m and on the number of times that γ1h appears amongst the γ1hi1 , i1 =
1, . . . , m.
(ii) Let 1 < g ≤ r and assume that Δ is (g − 1)-complete. Let b1, . . . , bg be from amongst the a1, . . . , am, 
and such that {b1, . . . , bg} /∈ Cg. Assume that γgh(b1, . . . , bg) ∧ Δ is consistent. Then
w(γgh(b1, . . . , bg) |Δ)
depends only on g and on
1. the number of times that γgh or an equivalent atom appear amongst the γ
g
hi1,...,ig
, {ai1 , . . . , aig} ∈ Cg.
2. the number of times that γgh or an equivalent atom could have appeared amongst the γ
g
hi1,...,ig
in Δ. 
That is, the number of g-sets {ai1 , . . . , aig} ∈ Cg, such that
(γghi1,...,ig  g − 1) (ai1 , . . . , aig)
is the (g − 1)-ary trace of γgf (ai1 , . . . , aig ) for some γgf ∼ γgh.
3. sgj where j = j(h) is such that γ
g
h ∈ Γgj ; that is, the number of atoms γgf such that γgf ∼ γgh and 
Δ ∧ γgf (b1, . . . , bg) is also consistent.
It might be hoped and expected that the Polyadic Suﬃcientness Postulate determines an interesting class 
of probability functions just like Johnson’s Suﬃcientness Postulate and the Binary Suﬃcientness Postulate 
12 Note that by the convention from page 38, any partial state description Δ(a1, . . . , am) is 1-complete.
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are the probability functions wλ1,...,λr for λg ∈ (0, ∞] determined as follows:
If we refer to the number from (i) above13 as mh, then
w(γ1h(am+1) |Δ) =
mh + λ12q
m + λ1
.
If j = j(h) and we refer to the numbers14 from (ii-1) and (ii-2) as ngj and v
g
j respectively, then
w(γgh(b1, . . . , bg) |Δ) =
ngj
sgj
+ λgsg
vgj + λg
(recall that q is the total number of relation symbols in our language and sg was deﬁned on page 39). We 
know that in the binary case discussed in the previous section, these are the unique regular probability 
functions satisfying Ex and the above principle. The general case remains to be further investigated.
3.4. A more general notion of a signature
We have concentrated on the notion of a signature deﬁned for an r-ary language via what we have called 
the (r-)atoms of this language (see page 37), the state formulae for r variables. We may extend the deﬁnition 
of g-atoms from page 37 where it was given for g ≤ r to any natural number g, so the g-atoms are the state 
formulae for g variables even when g > r, and introduce the relation ∼ between them as we have done using 
(43) for g ≤ r.
We can write a state description for m individuals as in (39) using g-atoms instead of atoms, and deﬁne 
the g-signature of a state description for m individuals (where g ≤ m) analogously to (r-)signatures. We 
end this paper with some observations regarding these g-signatures, a direction to be further researched.
It is easy to see that the g-signature of a state description determines its s-signature for s < g. Hence, 
for such s, g, a probability function which gives state descriptions with the same s-signature the same 
probability, must also give the same probability to state descriptions with the same g-signature.
Conversely, however, it is not the case that the s-signature of a state description determines its g-signature 
for s < g, not even when r ≤ s < g. One example, for r = 2, s = 2 and g = 3, is provided by the state 
descriptions on page 25. Here we give another example, for r = 2, s = 3 and g = 4:
Example. Let L contain one binary relation symbol. Then the 6 state formulae (3-atoms) represented by
1 1 1
2 1 1
2 2 1
1 2 2
1 1 2
1 1 1
1 1 2
2 1 2
1 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 1
2 2 1
1 2 2
1 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 1
2 1 2
2 1 1
are equivalent. Furthermore, the following two are also equivalent:
1 1 2
2 1 1
1 2 1
1 2 1
1 1 2
2 1 1
.
13 That is, if mh is the number of times that γ1h appears amongst the γ
1
hi1
.
14 That is, ngj is the number of times that γ
g
h or an equivalent atom appear amongst the γ
g
hi1,...,ig
, and vgj is the number of times 
that γgh or an equivalent atom could have appeared amongst the γ
g
h in Δ.i1 ,...,ig
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1 1 2 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1 1 2
2 2 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 1 2 1
1 1 1 2 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 1
feature only the above 3-atoms and it can be checked that they have the same 3-signature but not the same 
4-signature.
4. Conclusion
We based our investigation on the notion of (polyadic) atoms as our central building blocks, since they 
provide the smallest complete units from which state descriptions (and hence all sentences) can be built. 
Using this, we were able to propose, ﬁrst in the binary context and then for general polyadic languages, 
generalisations of the unary concept of a signature, and principles based on invariance under signatures (BEx, 
Sgx), independence, instantial relevance and an irrelevance principle generalising Johnson’s Suﬃcientness 
Postulate, as well as probability functions satisfying these. We have also introduced the more general 
g-atoms, and used these to deﬁne partial state descriptions. In addition, for binary languages we were able 
to completely characterise the probability functions satisfying, respectively, BEx, BEx and IP, Ex and BIP.
Proving a representation theorem characterising probability functions satisfying Sgx in the general 
polyadic context (for languages with relation symbols of arities higher than 2) would shed more light 
on the area but some new methods are needed to achieve this, and the problem remains a topic for further 
investigation.
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